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Abstract
In this article, I examine how gender parity is a viable mechanism to protect 
the capacity of transformation that characterizes democracy. Fundamentally, 
I contend that a democratic system needs to provide arenas of deliberation in 
order to contest gender relations and eradicate practices of domination. More-
over, I argue that the exclusion and censorship of groups that question the 
predominant gender practices contradicts the spirit of democracy. Therefore, if 
women do not find institutional paths to express their ideas and to materialize 
their desires and beliefs, democratic institutions must be designed so as to en-
able these processes of inclusion.
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Resumen
El artículo examina cómo la paridad de género es un mecanismo viable para 
proteger la capacidad de transformación que caracteriza a la democracia. Fun-
damentalmente, se sostiene que un sistema democrático debe ofrecer espacios 
de deliberación con el fin de debatir las relaciones de género y erradicar las 
prácticas de dominación. Así, se argumenta que la exclusión y censura de los 
grupos que cuestionan las prácticas predominantes de género contradice el es-
píritu de la democracia. Por lo tanto, si las mujeres no encuentran caminos 
institucionales para expresar sus ideas y materializar sus deseos y creencias, 
se deben diseñar instituciones democráticas que permitan su mayor inclusión.
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Introduction 
Derrida once stated that inherent to the 
concept of democracy is “‘the possibility of 
being contested’ [for] it presupposes its own 
perfectibility, and thus its own historicity.” 
(Noval, 2004, p. 151). For him, the power of 
democracy lies not on a rigid set of premises 
but on the opportunity of constant deconstruc-
tion. Consequently, democracy - as a political 
structure subject to perpetual change -contains 
within it the strength of transformation. This 
feature, nevertheless, not only enables its evolu-
tion but also makes it prone to revert into other 
forms of government. Accordingly, institutional 
boundaries must be designed to restrict the pos-
sibilities of mutation away from democracy. 
In this article, I analyze the topic of gen-
der parity. Gingerly, I embark on the task of 
deciphering its meaning, exposing the reasons 
that make its implementation valuable. From a 
theoretical and philosophical perspective, I exa-
mine how gender parity is a viable institutional 
mechanism to protect the capacity of transfor-
mation that characterizes democracy. Namely, 
I analyze how gender parity serves as a way of 
overriding practices of power as domination, 
empowering women so that their participation 
in the political bodies becomes a question of 
choice. As a result, I contend that a democratic 
system needs to provide arenas of deliberation 
in order to contest gender relations. 
The article takes a step away from the 
academic partitions that divide the various dis-
ciplines of the social sciences, proposing an ap-
proximation to gender relations and democracy 
from a multidimensional approach. I examine 
the works of a collection of authors with the 
purpose of extracting some key insights that 
might serve as a guide for questioning the need 
for gender parity. The article is structured into 
three key sections. Firstly, I explain what I un-
derstand by gender parity, formulating a con-
ceptualization that goes beyond the question of 
domination. Secondly, I tackle the subject of 
gender relations vs. hate relations, with the pur-
pose of differentiating gender interactions from 
other types of group relations. Lastly, I expli-
cate the potential of gender parity and how it 
provides an institutional space for democratic 
discussion. 
1. Democracy and gender parity: poli-
tical power and domination
1.1. Democracy, sexuality, and gender
Foucault (1980) once claimed, “In the 
space of a few centuries, a certain inclination 
has led us to direct the question of what we 
are to sex” (p. 78). This inquiry has surpassed 
the level of a purely introspective search, ins-
tilling itself in all sectors of the social fabric. 
Clearly, democracy has not been immune to the 
breakthroughs of this exploration; the subject of 
sex and gender increasingly sounds in political 
debates. The evolution of democratic institu-
tions slowly opens the possibility to challenge 
traditional conceptions that for centuries remai-
ned as undisputed truths, as topics relegated to 
silence. With time, democracy adapts itself in 
order to permit an ever-growing contestation 
to the beliefs and desires that have been seen 
as “natural” for years. Steadily, these develop-
ments cause profound cultural changes, unima-
ginable for past generations; but, contrary to the 
common contention of some international theo-
ries,1 these transformations are not the result of 
impositions but of a slow process of delibera-
tion, which is still in progress and will endure.
When for the Greeks it seemed impossible 
to detach “sexuality” from “the household 
(oikos), with its economic, political, and 
religious functions; from the state (especially as 
the reproduction of citizenship); from religion 
[…]; or from class and estate (as the determiner 
of property of sexual acts, and the like)” 
(Padgug, 1979, p. 16); today the composition 
of sexuality and gender is recurrently dissected. 
As a result, the “natural” notions of sexuality 
suffer constant deconstruction. In the global 
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north, for instance, where tradition has slowly 
let go of its grip on the social consciousness, 
gender roles are frequently contested along 
with the “natural” meanings of sexuality. More 
and more the understandings of the “natural” 
attributes of sexuality are being displaced 
by approximations that focus on gender as a 
socially constructed phenomenon. 
The cultural and political transforma-
tions of the global north on the issues of gen-
der cannot make us think that the end result is 
the definition of democracy, that the outcome 
embodies democracy’s true meaning. It is dan-
gerous to see democracy as a static point of 
arrival, as homogeneous order or a standardi-
zed system. Democracy is a process and not a 
true unitary identity. One cannot assume that 
gender relations of a determinate culture are 
better than others. What one has to ask is not 
how to impose the results of a particular de-
mocracy into another culture in order to pro-
mote gender equality, but how to strengthen 
the democratic processes so as to permit other 
cultures to live and create their own change. In 
other words, how to reinforce democracy and 
democratic identity so as to guarantee the free 
contention and modification of gender beliefs 
and desires?
1.2. Democracy, power and domination
After an extensive empirical and theoreti-
cal study about women’s leadership, Eagly and 
Karau (2002) conclude: 
This analysis led us to argue that prejudices 
toward female leaders consists of two types 
of disadvantage: (a) Deriving from the des-
criptive aspect of the female gender role is 
the perception of women as possessing less 
leadership ability than men, and (b) deriving 
from the injunctive aspect of the female role is 
the less favorable evaluation of behavior that 
fulfills the prescription of a leader role (and 
thereby violates the female gender role) when 
this behavior is enacted by women compared 
with men (p. 588).
The uncritical perusal of the claims made 
by the authors might tempt us to automatically 
condemn the prejudices towards female lea-
ders. One must, nonetheless, stop and embrace 
the weight of the issue. Firstly, the conclusions 
capture the opinions of both men and women. 
Correspondingly, the disadvantages are ge-
nerated by a set of beliefs and desires shared 
by society as a whole, and not simply by men. 
Secondly, though the prejudices are troubling 
from a democratic theory perspective, the di-
lemma is even graver when the topic of culture 
comes into play. It reminds us that, at the end, 
any measure intended to consolidate a more 
inclusive democratic system cannot disregard 
culture. 
James G. March and Johan P. Olsen 
(2005) write, “Rules, routines, norms, and iden-
tities are both instruments of stability and arenas 
of change” (p. 13). In this sense, stability and 
change do not surface as contradictory energies 
but as dynamics that interact within democracy. 
Norms and routines provide a space where pro-
cesses that promote change can always mobili-
ze and manifest. 
It is important to keep in mind that the 
enactment of norms and regulations does 
not trigger an immediate transformation. 
The fact that “an enhanced or even equal 
representation of women in political decision-
making bodies does not automatically mean 
that gender equality has been achieved” 
(Fuchs, & Hoecker, 2004, p. 1) reemphasizes 
the significance of taking into account culture 
when endorsing certain norms and regulations.2 
Moreover, one must be careful not to classify 
a determinate culture as undemocratic, simply 
because traditional gender relations create a 
particular result. What one has to guarantee is 
that institutional processes avoid replicating 
practices of domination that hinder democracy. 
But what is domination? The first reaso-
nable answer would be to say that domination is 
a type of power. According to Foucault (1980), 
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“power is not an institution, and not a structure; 
neither is it a certain strength we are endowed 
with; it is the name that one attributes to a com-
plex strategic situation in a particular society” 
(p. 93). For him, power is not something that 
can be grasped, obtained or exercised. Co-
rrespondingly, the complex strategic situation 
he describes consists of a permanent state of 
affairs and not a simple moment or instant in 
which one individual prevails over the other. 
Moreover, the permanency of power implies 
inescapability. It presents itself as a continuous 
force that acts over the social body. Any attempt 
to modify the particularities of the strategic si-
tuation, if successful, only manages to change 
its attributes, but it does not eliminate power 
(See Foucault, 1997). 
If one accepts the definition of power 
expounded, one would still have to unders-
tand what distinguishes domination from other 
manifestations of power. According to Lemke 
(2010): 
Foucault reserves the term ‘domination’ for 
those asymmetrical relationships of power 
in which the freedom subordinated persons 
have little room for maneuver because of their 
‘extremely limited margin of freedom’. […] 
They are characterized by the fact that an in-
dividual or a group has succeeded in blocking 
the field of power relations and in establishing 
a permanent asymmetry (p. 37).
It is here that power and freedom are theo-
retically bounded together. Basically, power 
with very limited freedom is domination; and 
power with freedom is simply power. 
This reasoning leads us to an inescapa-
ble question: can power without domination 
really exist? Don’t all manifestations of power 
constrain freedom? Maybe one illustration can 
help clarify the trademarks of Foucault’s inter-
pretations, so as to distinguish the particulari-
ties of domination. The segregation of public 
bathrooms is a clear example of traditional 
practices where power exists but it is almost 
never perceived. As Erving Goffman (1977) ca-
refully explains, 
The functioning of sex-differentiated organs is 
involved, but there is nothing in this functio-
ning that biologically recommends segre-
gation; that arrangement is a totally cultural 
matter […]. […] toilet segregation is presen-
ted as a natural consequence of the difference 
between the sex-classes when in fact it is a 
means of honoring, if not producing, this di-
fference (p. 316).
What the author describes is a power re-
lation that replicates certain behaviors without 
the need of coercion or violence. As a matter of 
fact, power has become so entrenched within 
society’s beliefs that the compliance with the 
norm seems completely natural. Here, power is 
not something that one individual or group is en-
dowed with. People comply with the division of 
the public bathrooms because they perceive it as 
rational. Desires and beliefs guide their behavio-
ral practices and, though clearly in the presen-
ce of a relation of power, they do not perceive 
the gender division of bathrooms as a form of 
domination.3 They freely choose to respect the 
segregation of bathrooms, without viewing it as 
an imposition by a specific individual or group.
One might wonder why the discussion of 
domination is relevant when tackling the sub-
ject of gender relations and democracy. Basica-
lly, the essence of a democratic system of go-
vernance is the consecration of forms of power 
that minimize the need of coercion and violen-
ce. In a democracy, though the nation-state has 
the monopoly of the legitimate use of violence, 
this type of power is not the most common. In 
other words, in an ideal democracy political 
power replaces on most occasions power as do-
mination.4 The individual follows the rules be-
cause he or she recognizes their political autho-
rity and not necessarily because of the threat of 
the use of violence. 
In order to reduce the instances in which 
coercion is required, democracy accepts hetero-
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geneity, rejecting and counterbalancing the for-
ces that seek to posit one unanimous culture as a 
“true identity”. This provides a social conscious-
ness in which the community views the norms 
and regulations as a source of protection and not 
as an asymmetrical imposition by a determinate 
group. Concretely, it provides a political envi-
ronment that hinders acts of domination that pla-
ce one group of society over another. This does 
not mean that power disputes do not take place 
but that the key element of power derives from 
its recognition. Accordingly, those who lose in a 
political runoff acknowledge the victory of the 
other without the need of coercion or violence. 
They comprehend the dynamics and reasons be-
hind the political process, considering it not as a 
form of domination but as a natural result inhe-
rent to democracy. 
When talking about gender, the premises 
of democracy expounded must not simply be ig-
nored. The consecration of norms and laws that 
place women under a state of domination con-
tradicts the very principles of democracy. Con-
sequently, gender relations ought to be allowed 
to flourish as a result of political power and not 
as an expression of domination. Hence, the only 
limitation to the multiple manifestations of gen-
der relations within democracy is traced by the 
condemnation of gender domination. All other 
ways of gender interaction that materialize as 
an outcome of political power, even when they 
create determinate roles within society, cannot 
be seen as anti-democratic.
1.3. Parity beyond domination
Keeping in mind the approximation to 
power discussed, one has to analyze how parity 
becomes a viable mechanism to resist practi-
ces of domination, so as to propagate political 
power within gender relations. As defended by 
most of the pro-parity factions and as conceived 
in many electoral laws,5 parity refers to candi-
dacies rather than results. As it will be explai-
ned, it embodies a democratic instrument that 
aims at opening a space where gender relations 
have an actual possibility of contestation. Sim-
ply stated, parity centers on two main issues: 1) 
the creation of an institutional process in which 
fifty percent of the candidates are women, and 
2) the modification of the traditional notions of 
citizenship.
Ruth Rubio-Marín (2012) provides us 
with an interesting conceptualization of parity. 
She sustains,
[Parity’s] core objective is to unsettle the se-
parate spheres tradition, understood as the 
tradition that separates the public from the 
private domain; defines them respectively as 
primarily male and female domains; recog-
nizes only the public sphere as a domain of 
citizenship and power; devalues the social re-
levance of the activities and forms of partici-
pation that take place in the so-called private 
sphere while at the same time depoliticizing 
the forms of male power and hierarchy that 
find expression within it (p. 103).
This definition goes past the mere unders-
tanding of gender parity as a measure that aims 
to empower women by elaborating policies that 
augment their representation in appointed bo-
dies and in elected institutions.6 Her notions of 
parity surpass the question of numbers and su-
ggest a reconceptualization of citizenship, one 
that shifts the lines that divide the public and 
the privet spheres.7
Despite the positive aspects, I have one 
fundamental objection to the author’s conten-
tions. I find the use of the term male power trou-
bling. This particular usage of the expression is 
dangerous for it disregards the influence of gen-
der relations, closing the scope of parity to the 
question of domination. That is, it neglects the 
fact that gender relations are mostly the result 
of shared beliefs and desires.8 By centering the 
debate on domination, the importance of for-
ming political power is pushed to the margins 
of the discussion. If one employs the term male 
power, readers might be led to believe that men 
are to blame. Consequently, any disparity bet-
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ween the genders could be viewed as a direct 
result of male replicated practices of domina-
tion and not as a mutually constructed reality.
The advocacy for parity cannot be purely 
seen as a cultural imposition or as a reaction to 
practices of domination. Parity goes beyond do-
mination and focuses on the promotion of spa-
ces that make political power thrive in gender 
relations. It is intended to descry the complex 
dynamics that guide the interaction between 
men and women, creating a setting in which po-
litical deliberation prevails over practices of do-
mination. By focusing on domination, one dis-
regards the main sources that replicate gender 
relations. Namely, it consecrates an institutional 
safeguard that hopes to impede the exclusion of 
women from political life.
I have insisted that democracy should not 
be about instilling a homogeneous identity or 
a uniform type of gender relations. Thus, the 
center of the debate about parity should not be 
about placing the blame, as if it was an issue 
of a balance of power where men hold one po-
sition and women another; but on how parity 
serves as an institutional mechanism that helps 
create a political space for the contestation of 
gender relations. Accordingly, I define parity 
as a process that guarantees the possibility of 
contesting gender relations, which redefines the 
notions of citizenship and recognizes the social 
value of the activities and ways of participation 
that take place in the commonly named priva-
te sphere.9 In the last section, I will expand on 
what the acceptance of this definition implies. 
For now, I want to address some of the theoreti-
cal difficulties and challenges to gender parity. 
2. The compatibility of gender parity 
and democracy
2.1. Dilemmas of equality
One of the most severe theoretical chasms 
and complications that those who advocate for 
gender parity encounter has to do with concilia-
ting its promotion with the notion of equality. 
The challenges emanate primarily from two re-
lated fronts, which derive from each other. The 
first springs from the understanding of equality 
in its formal sense. Hence, any action that makes 
a distinction and gives a determinate advantage 
to a specific community or group is seen as con-
tradictory to the clauses of formal equality,10 for 
it unbalances the grounds for political engage-
ment. Those who favor this stance view demo-
cracy as a system that is meant to even out the 
field for the contesting interest to compete. As if 
transposing the logic of the invisible hand, they 
comprehend democracy as a system that allows 
antagonistic interests to fairly dispute for a po-
sition in the government’s agenda. 
This type of reasoning is somewhat si-
milar to what some theorists have categorized 
as an aggregative model of democracy. It “in-
terprets democracy as a process of aggregating 
the preferences of citizens in choosing public 
officials and policies” (Young, 2000, p.19). 
Under this model, theoretically, the big inter-
ests correspond to the preferences that count 
with the widest and strongest public support. 
Likewise, in an ideal type of democracy, poli-
ticians formulate their proposals in such a way 
that they encompass the interests of the grea-
test number of voters. Democracy institutio-
nalizes a competitive process through which 
political parties and candidates generate pro-
positions that attract the largest number of in-
dividuals (Young, 2000). 
If democracy is “a form of government 
in which the ruling power of a State is legally 
vested, not in a particular class or classes, but 
in the members of the community as a whole” 
(Bryce, 1923, p. 23), in the aggregative model 
the significance rests on the fact that, by giving 
the power to the people, the governmental 
agenda should emerge from the competition 
of interests. This contest of visions and/or 
interests evolves within a series of categorical 
norms, which specify some basic binding 
principles that oblige the restraint of the 
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parties in conflict. These principles constrain 
the possibilities of fulfillment of the winning 
interests by establishing a set of restrictions to 
their implementation – i.e. the respect of human 
rights, inclusion, freedom, and common good, 
among others. Put differently, a democratic 
system, in order to legitimize a result, “requires 
that citizens’ conflicting interests all be 
protected equally” (Mansbridge, 1980, p.4). 
In a very similar line of thought as the 
one of the aggregative model, the contradictors 
of gender parity uphold that the government 
should only guarantee a formal initial station 
in which all individuals stand as equals, so as 
to let competing interests combat on a leveled 
ground. Consequently, the government should 
solely act to correct and prevent occurrences 
that generate a threat to the freedom and equa-
lity of those who participate. Thus, any affirma-
tive action that artificially boosts the original 
starting situation of a community or group is 
considered a danger to the principle of formal 
equality. It is perceived as a perilous formula-
tion that opens the door for the consecration of 
policies of unfair disadvantage, favoring some 
and not others.11 
As a response to the critics, some pro-
parity factions have defended their position by 
outlining the need for a substantive12 rather than 
just formal recognition of equality.13 They argue 
that the evenness of the field is simply a judi-
cial fiction that fails to address the substantive 
deficiencies that can disrupt the proper functio-
ning of democracy. From this perspective, the 
mere formal understanding of equality actually 
paves an initial situation in which some groups 
or communities enjoy a head start that permits 
them reach power positions more easily. This is 
due to historical and cultural patterns of mar-
ginalization that tile the playing field in such 
a way that some are granted structural leads 
while others are constantly held back. Subse-
quently, those in favor of gender parity reason 
that, in order to correct the recurrence of practi-
ces exclusion, equality should be accepted in its 
substantive sense; the government is called to 
correct the relegation of some groups to the si-
delines and implement policies that effectively 
place them in the political playing field.14 
It is here, nonetheless, that the second 
front opens. Even when accepting the premi-
ses for substantive equality, the contending side 
fundamentally asserts that the implementation 
of quotas and parity measures menaces the prin-
ciple of representation and, correspondingly, the 
possibility of some type of union. These strictu-
res underpin their allegations on their concep-
tions of representative democracy. Respectively, 
they highlight that representation warrants the 
pursuance of a common good. In this sense, to 
defend gender parity “would imply the impos-
sibility of one gender representing the interests 
of the other” (Rodríguez-Ruiz, & Rubio-Marín, 
2009, p. 1179). Both the critics and “most de-
fenders of gender parity emphasize their com-
mitment to the unitary, general, and abstract no-
tion of representation - to the idea that, with or 
without parity (indeed with or without quotas), 
elected representatives, both male and female, 
should represent all citizens, both male and fe-
male” (Rodríguez-Ruiz, & Rubio-Marín, 2009, 
p. 1180). This position, however, raises a series 
of questions that create a never-ending circle. 
Firstly, if one accepts the principle of represen-
tation, how can gender parity be justified? Se-
condly, if one manages to justify gender parity, 
why would other underrepresented groups not 
have the same advantages? Thirdly, if all unde-
rrepresented groups have access to quotas, then 
wouldn’t the unitary abstract notion of represen-
tation become obsolete? 
To answer the first questions, defenders of 
gender equality mostly claim that parity would 
not affect the principle of representation. In an 
ideal situation, both women and men would re-
present all citizens. Parity would only be im-
plemented temporarily so as to make the con-
ditions of formal equality substantial. In other 
words, parity would be a provisional measure 
directed at correcting an imbalance in the po-
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litical field, with the purpose of eradicating the 
historical exclusion of women from the public 
realm. 
The implementation of an interim situa-
tion of parity, nevertheless, would also justify 
the creation of quotas for other groups and com-
munities that have also been historically margi-
nalized from the political arena. This would lead 
to a scenario of mirror representation. Under 
this conception, “ideas cannot be entirely disso-
ciated from experience and identity, so that there 
is a need for representative political bodies to 
reflect more accurately the plurality of the socie-
ty they represent” (Rodríguez-Ruiz, & Rubio-
Marín, 2009, p. 1180). Correspondingly, via the 
premises of mirror representation, a multiplicity 
of quotas would exist, so that each group repre-
sents its particular interest. As a consequence, 
the public space would emulate the heteroge-
neous composition of the population. 
Wouldn’t the imposition of a mirror type 
of democracy fragment the abstract notion of 
representation? This is basically the doubt that 
the third question raises; and, paradoxically, the 
answer takes us back to the first interrogation, 
starting a problematic circle that at first sight 
seems to have no way out. Mirror representa-
tion would theoretically reject the possibility of 
a shared common democratic identity, and pro-
bably propagate the consolidations of true iden-
tities that distance themselves from the ideals 
that characterize the social body. Each group, 
because of the peculiarities of their experien-
ces, would only be able to represent itself. Un-
der this scenario, negotiation and communica-
tion between the various factions could exist, 
but the end result would resemble a fragmented 
body, rather than a representative union that 
synthesizes the identity of whole.
One might ask: could one justify gender 
parity through the principle of equality in a way 
that it benefits only women and not other un-
derrepresented groups? Would this theoretical 
justification be inconsistent with the ideals of 
democracy? At first sight, the structure of such 
a vindication resembles what George Orwell fa-
mously coined as “doublethink”, which means 
“the power of holding two contradictory belie-
fs in one’s mind simultaneously, and accepting 
both of them” (Orwell, 1948, p. 270). Expli-
citly, any allegation in this direction would not 
only appear to oppose to the ideal of equality, 
but also disregard the elements that make up the 
democracy. 
In order to escape this never-ending circle, 
pro-parity supporters have developed a variety 
of theoretical approximations. Blanca Rodrí-
guez-Ruiz and Ruth Rubio-Marín (2009), for 
example, following Pateman’s understanding of 
the sexual contract,15 advocate for the necessi-
ty of parity in order to dislocate the lines that 
separate public from private acts. They contend 
that parity dismantles the sexual contract and 
forms a broader and more inclusive conception 
of public sphere.16 As a way to justify parity, the 
authors differentiate the initial position of wo-
men from that of other underrepresented groups, 
by outlining the masculine preponderant unders-
tanding of citizenship and the fact that gender is 
a transversal feature that is present in all races, 
nationalities, or religions. They write, 
This does not mean that the exclusion or un-
derrepresentation of other groups is irrelevant 
or insufficiently expressive of a democratic 
deficit that deserves attention. It means rather 
that parity has its own democratic logic, a 
logic distinct from, though compatible with, 
the logic of representation quotas of minority 
groups. Parity democracy is then an enterpri-
se concerned with redefining the sexes, state, 
and democracy in such a way that human in-
terdependence gains a central place in the pu-
blic sphere (Rodríguez-Ruiz, & Rubio-Marín, 
2009, p. 1183).
I agree with the authors but also think it 
is pivotal to emphasize a greater difference bet-
ween the marginalization of minorities and that 
of women. I believe that the failure to distin-
guish the particularities of women’s situation 
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and to evidence its dissimilarity with the con-
dition of other underrepresented groups hinders 
the advancement towards women’s inclusion 
in the public sphere. More precisely, I consider 
that there has been a theoretical miscalculation 
in which the individualities of gender relations 
and hate relations have not been fully examined. 
2.2. Hate and gender relations
Some feminists have adopted an openly 
belligerent position when addressing women’s 
rights. They have exceedingly centered on si-
tuations of domination, in which women are 
overpowered by men’s desires and beliefs. This 
causes the assimilation of women’s condition to 
that of the other underrepresented groups. More 
concretely, the depiction of the situation of wo-
men primarily as one against domination makes 
their struggle more similar to that of other mar-
ginalized communities. Under these types of 
approximations, two separate countering forces 
are the portrayed: the oppressor and oppressed. 
The relation between men and women is then 
compared to other relations, in which the divi-
sions between the sides are more precisely de-
marcated. 
Furthermore, some authors have con-
centrated on highlighting the particularity of 
women’s situation. Accordingly, they argue that 
gender: 
Is not merely another factor of differentiation: 
it is, by nature, cross-cutting in that it is im-
mutable, noncontingent, or, as claimed, the 
prima division (the universal difference) be-
cause it is the only difference that cannot be 
disassociated from the notion of personhood 
(Rodríguez-Ruiz & Rubio-Marín, 2008, p. 
302). 
Though the contentions within these argu-
ments are strong, they disregard the uniqueness 
of gender relations. Hence, this position misses 
the fact that it is not only a question about wo-
men or men’s particular identity or difference 
but about their shared desires and beliefs. 
The practices that characterize gender re-
lations are very distant to those that typify hate 
relations. Consistently, when analyzing why 
gender parity should be seen as a reasonable 
measure, one has to center in gender relations 
rather than in relations of hate. Let me explica-
te. Hate relations are those in which practices 
of domination are the main form of interaction. 
Thus, they constitute a “relationship of violence 
[that] acts upon a body or upon things; it forces, 
it bends, it breaks on the wheel, it destroys, or 
it closes the door on all possibilities” (Foucault, 
1982, p. 789). Explicitly, each side in a hate 
relation holds a determinate identity that con-
cretely opposes to the other’s identity. Racism, 
homophobia, fundamentalism, xenophobia, and 
other forms of isms and phobias are all types 
of hate relations. Therefore, the essence of con-
tradiction and conflict entails the promotion of 
beliefs and desires that advocate for the consti-
tution of relations of domination. Hate relations 
conjugate desires and beliefs that pervade into-
lerance, exclusion, and inequality. 
Albeit one acknowledges that in the in-
teraction between men and women some si-
tuations inherent to hate relations occur, domi-
nation is not the preponderant trait present in 
gender relations.17 By placing too much atten-
tion on practices of hate, one fails to recogni-
ze the particularity of gender relations. That is, 
one disregards the main force that replicates the 
desires and beliefs that frame male and female 
interaction. To overlook the distinctiveness of 
gender relations causes the reduction and sim-
plification of the relations of men and women 
to the realm of domination. This theoretical 
approach not only constitutes a critical mistake 
but also takes away some of the main justifica-
tions for gender parity.
Taking these ideas into account, I will 
attempt to justify gender parity from a gender 
relation’s perspective. I will try to answer to the 
three inquires to gender parity, searching for a 
theoretical way to escape the never-ending cir-
cle. Namely, I will examine how gender parity 
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can be justified, why other underrepresented 
vulnerable groups not necessarily have the same 
advantages, and why gender parity fits into the 
unitary abstract notion of representation.
2.3. Can gender parity be justified?
As argued before, gender relations are not 
mainly the result of domination. They are also 
the reflection of a set shared of beliefs and de-
sires that guide the interaction between women 
and men.18 Accordingly, in a democracy, gender 
relations should be granted a space where their 
predominant practices can be contested. Gender 
parity, therefore, is not a consecration of two 
distinct identities (men’s and women’s), but the 
recognition of the duality of gender interaction. 
It is not a question of the existence of opposing 
beliefs and desires; it is a matter of integrating 
both sides that make up the human sexuality. 
Because of cultural and historical reasons, 
the public domain has been largely male direc-
ted. With the transformation of democracy’s 
boundaries of signification, the exclusion of 
women from the public realm begins to be 
viewed as an internal contradiction to democra-
cy. The marginalization of women from the pu-
blic sphere is a potential source of domination 
that democratic institutions must aim to control, 
oversee, and monitor. If democracy strives to 
eradicate practices of domination that embody 
patterns of inequality and intolerance, gender 
parity materializes as a viable measure of re-
gulation. 
Gender parity opens a space for commu-
nication, in which gender relations can be dis-
cussed freely. It guarantees both sides the op-
portunity of communicating on equal grounds 
in order to determine the guidelines for male/fe-
male interaction. Essentially, gender parity per-
mits the democratic deliberation of the beliefs 
and desires that characterize gender relations 
within society, giving each side an equal voice 
to put their opinion through. This way, gender 
parity serves as one democratic institutional 
mechanism that helps avoid the vicissitudes of 
gender domination. In a hypothetical situation, 
in which one side would seek to maintain the 
desires and beliefs that guide the interaction 
between the sexes by force and violence, gender 
parity could be one instrument to correct and 
counterbalance this anti-democratic force. Con-
cretely, gender parity is not about how each side 
constructs its own identity, but how they work 
together to create, transform, and maintain the 
identity that typifies their gender relations. 
2.4. Would other underrepresented groups 
not have the same advantages?
The establishment of quotas aims to bring 
underrepresented groups into the public sphere. 
Fundamentally, it is projected to correct phobias 
and isms within society by making the repre-
sentative body more heterogeneous. As it was 
discussed, gender relations are fundamentally 
different from relations of hate. I do not mean 
to indicate that the establishment of quotas to 
benefit underrepresented groups is unimportant. 
I do want to highlight, however, the categorical 
difference between gender relations and rela-
tions of hate; and, consequently, the difference 
between gender parity and other type of quotas. 
As expounded before, gender relations 
are not the consecration of two separate iden-
tities. Contrarily, they are a reflection of a set 
of desires and beliefs shared by both men and 
women. Relations of hate, on the other hand, do 
emerge as a division of two or more identities. 
If one recognizes this fundamental difference, 
one has to wonder if the same institutional me-
chanism can serve to generate a particular re-
sult: specifically, the consolidation of a stronger 
democratic identity.
As we saw, the objective of gender parity 
is the protection of gender relations, the cons-
truction of a space where these can be cons-
tantly contested and transformed by both of the 
sides involved. It is not a question of two sepa-
rate identities, but of an identity shared by both. 
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Quotas on the other hand would aim at transfor-
ming hate relations into power relations created 
by shared beliefs and desires. I am not here to 
analyze whether this is possible or not.19 If quo-
tas serve as a way to correct hate relations and 
convert them into power relations that avoid 
true identities and domination, I think they need 
to be implemented. This topic, nonetheless, 
would need its own particular theoretical and 
philosophical study. Basically, one must exami-
ne if minority quotas can be a proper democra-
tic instrument to change hate relations.
2.5. Does gender parity fit into the unitary 
abstract notion of representation?
As it was addressed before, gender parity 
would not constitute a system of opposing iden-
tities. It does not emerge from a conception of a 
mirror democracy. Gender parity is not a ques-
tion of consecrating a separate irreconcilable 
identity. Contrarily, it centers on how gender 
relations are the result of a complex situation 
of interaction between women and men. As a 
historical construction, these relations incarnate 
the particular cultural desires and beliefs. They 
do not support themselves on mainly domina-
tion but are a shared identity that guides practi-
ces of communication. For this reason, gender 
party does not distance itself from the unitary 
abstract notion of representation. On the con-
trary, it symbolizes the formation of a democra-
tic identity that helps impede the displacement 
of gender relations towards domination.
3. The potential of gender parity
There is no political consensus on whether 
democratic measures that foster and guarantee 
matching presence in representative bodies are 
appropriate (Rodríguez-Ruiz, & Rubio-Marín, 
2008, p. 287). I think, nevertheless, that the 
importance of gender parity measures lies on 
the recognition of gender relations. Charles 
Tilly observed that the causes of a revolution 
involve “the appearance of contenders […], 
commitment to these claims by a significant 
segment of the population, [and] incapacity or 
unwillingness of the agents of the government 
to suppress the alternative coalition and/or com-
mitment to its claims” (Tilly, 1978, p. 200). If 
one takes this into account, the implementation 
of gender parity would make the government 
both incapable and unwilling to oppose to a 
democratic transformation of gender relations. 
Basically, it would inhibit acts of coercion and 
violence.
Moreover, though my definition goes be-
yond the mere understanding of gender parity 
as a project that aims to empower women by 
elaborating policies that augment their repre-
sentation in appointed bodies or in elected insti-
tutions, gender parity still implies the possibility 
of equal representation. Two distinct strategies 
would make up the institutionalization of parity. 
The first rests on the reconfiguration of 
the public sphere, so as to integrate the actions 
that traditionally have been seen as private. 
Gender parity here entails the recognition 
of acts of caring and of interdependency, 
the search for policies that politicize gender 
relations, and the education of citizenry on 
the ideals of democracy. Rules, norms, and 
plans to pervade gender parity encompass 
the creation of ministries, agencies, and other 
institutional offices that concentrate on bringing 
into the public debate the voices that for years 
have been confined to the private sphere. It is 
not about the promotion of positive actions, 
but about the reconfiguration of citizenship as 
a whole: about the elaboration of spaces where 
gender relations come into politics.
The second strategy lies on the possibili-
ty of equal representation. I highlight the word 
possibility because gender parity is not about 
demanding a result of political participation. 
In other words, it is not about stating that fif-
ty percent of the representatives of in elected 
institutions have to be men, and the other fifty 
women. The type of process that gender parity 
comprehends is that the fifty percent of the can-
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didates that participate in electoral processes 
have to be women. Though this demand seems 
to go back to the issue of numbers, it distances 
itself by stressing the importance of the process 
rather than the result. If the citizenry decides to 
vote for a male directed public sphere because 
of their understanding of gender relations, the 
result is equally valid. The emphasis on parity 
is then on the enactment of a mechanism that 
gives a possibility for the contestation of pre-
dominant gender relations. 
The disregard for gender parity as an 
opportunity for actual equal representation can 
cause the replication of practices of domination. 
When institutionalizing the possibility of 
creating a 50/50 representative body, gender 
parity stands as a mechanism that controls that 
majority forces do not disregard the duality of 
gender relations. Correspondingly, the advocacy 
for gender parity does not consist on measuring 
the number of men vs. the number of women in 
the representative bodies, but on endorsing the 
process. It involves guaranteeing the possibility 
of democratic change. 
Likewise, gender parity could serve as 
one institutional tool that impedes that “an in-
dividual or a group […] [succeeds] in blocking 
the field of power relations and in establishing 
a permanent asymmetry” (Lemke, 2010, p. 37). 
The enforcement of the possibility of making 
representation perfectly symmetrical position 
itself as a regulative force that intends to correct 
the disparities that may and do exist within gen-
der relations. These are not only asymmetries 
in regards to the number of representatives, but 
also those that present themselves as a deficien-
cy of equal recognition. 
Basically, gender parity would permit 
a more adequate functioning of a deliberative 
model democracy. This model describes demo-
cratic deliberation as a “form of practical reason, 
[in which] participants […] offer proposals for 
how best to solve problems to meet legitimate 
needs, and so on, and they present arguments 
through which they aim to persuade others to 
accept their proposals” (Young, 2000, p. 22). As 
a result, the big interests emerge from a com-
plex communication process through which the 
diverse members of society determine which 
collective proposals are accepted based on rea-
son (Cohen, 1989; Mansbridge, 1980, Bohman, 
1996). In this sense, the approval of a proposal 
is not determined merely by the pure strength 
of the number. It is not only a question of which 
interests gain the greatest amount of votes. Par-
ticipants in the deliberative model reach a deci-
sion by a process of discussion through which 
the collective selects the proposals that contain 
the most reasonable arguments. Communica-
tion plays a vital role in the decision making 
process, for it is through the discussion of ideas 
that the private interests advance towards the 
construction of collective interests. 
Parity constitutes an institutional mecha-
nism that opens the door for the actual 
deliberation between genders. This is because 
it places institutional boundaries that reduce the 
chances of domination within gender relations. 
It gives society the possibility of questioning 
predominant gender practices that guide the 
interaction between men and women. Without 
gender parity, the discussion of ideas in many 
countries will persistently reflect the interest of 
a predominantly controlled male government. 
Even if male leaders continue to occupy most 
of the seats of congress or parliament because 
of gender desires and beliefs, parity would 
not only provide the continual possibility of 
configuring a more gender balanced system, 
but also puts the discussion of gender relations 
on the table of deliberation. It allows future 
transformations to occur and, at the same 
time, creates institutional limits that protect 
democracy from regression, from the exclusion 
of women of the political debates.
Conclusion
The rhetoric about democracy has per-
meated the research of politics throughout the 
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national and international spectrum. Growing 
at an exponential rate, the literature on the pro-
motion of human rights, the role of civil society, 
the defense of freedoms, the advocacy for par-
ticipation -i.e. all that is related to the study of 
democratic systems-, tends to cluster and over-
ly narrow down most of the social phenome-
na and crisis. It seems that the answer to social 
ordeals always leads towards democracy (or a 
lack of it). Despite the growing emphasis on 
the importance of democracy, the desire for 
immediate transformations towards a more 
democratic world has paradoxically boosted 
undemocratic practices, which somehow find 
a justification if the end result is a more demo-
cratic society. 
The common good in democracy does 
not emerge from the existence of uniform in-
terests; but it can be “interpreted simply as the 
addressing of problems that people face togeth-
er, without any assumption that these people 
have common interests or common way of life, 
or that they must subordinate or transcend the 
particular interest and values that differentiate 
them” (Young, 2000, p. 40). Chiefly, the com-
mon good is not a clear route that guides society 
to specific point of arrival. On the contrary, the 
common good forms from the communication 
of difference. 
As recognition of cultural divergences, 
gender parity enables a process in which the 
gender relations can be defined according to 
democratic principles.20 Accordingly, parity 
does not impose a uniform understanding of the 
gender relations, nor does it disregard cultural 
differences. It creates a space where all the 
communities can communicate in the public 
sphere so as to debate the desires and beliefs 
that replicate patterns of interaction between 
men and women. If “democratic change needs 
to be generated through democratic forms of 
action” (Teivainen, 2011, p. 182), then gender 
parity is a democratic mechanism to enable 
the manifestation of the voices that demand 
transformative actions. 
Finally, the recognition of difference 
is essential when undertaking the study of 
democracy and gender. The theoretical and 
practical approaches that propose to create 
a more democratic world must learn from 
heterogeneity, and not see the world through the 
prism of uniformity. Those who advocate for 
the propagation of democracy cannot apply a 
one model fit all strategy. On the contrary, they 
must embrace difference and find ways so that 
democracy can integrate more easily within the 
cultural imaginary. 
Notes
1 Particularly the theory of democratic 
peace has somehow mutated into a new form 
of imperialism that justifies the imposition of 
democracy as a viable way of constructing 
democratic societies. Heikki Patomäki analyzes 
the flaws that permeate the democratic theory. 
See Patomäki (2008).
2 Charter Taylor (1994) and Axel Honneth 
(1995) are two authors who analyze the topic of 
culture from different perspectives, examining 
how democracy deals with problems of recog-
nition. 
3 Though some in society might question 
the division of public bathrooms and conceive it 
as a form of domination, most comply with the 
segregation for they perceive it as important. 
4 Mark Haugaard (2010, p. 1051) elabo-
rates a detailed analysis on how power relations 
are created in a democratic system. He defends 
that in an ideal democracy political power re-
places in most instances power as domination.
5 See Rodríguez-Ruiz, & Rubio-Marín, 
(2009); Parijs, (1996); Warren, (1996).
6 I chose the conceptualization given 
by Ruth Rubio-Marín because she is one of 
the authors that has emphasized on the need 
for changing the notions of citizenship when 
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addressing the subject of gender parity. She has 
written extensively on the subject of democratic 
parity, elaborating some of the key works on 
the topic. Other authors have also retraced the 
definitional borders that separate the public and 
the private. However, as Rubio-Marín, they 
have also centered on the issues of domination. 
See: Walby (1994); Jónasdóttir (1988); Keating 
(2007); Pateman (1988); Waylen (1994); Beer 
(2009); Adkins (2008); Boucher (2003).
7 In regards to the private sphere, Raia 
Prokhovinik (1998) writes, “Women who choose 
to stay in the private realm are undervalued as 
people, both by society and by men. The caring 
and nurturing undertaken by such women is taken 
for granted; its perceived social value is very low. 
However this paper would argue that the ‘natural 
obligations’ parents are seen to have in bringing 
up children should also be recognized and valued 
as ethically-grounded ‘civic obligations’, as part 
of citizenship.” (p. 88)
8 I understand that in some respects gender 
relations are the result of situations of domina-
tion. Rape is a clear example of a manifestation 
of asymmetric power within gender relations. 
I contend, however, that the primary force that 
drives gender relations is not domination but 
shared desires and beliefs. 
9 This definition is very similar to the 
one given by Rubio-Marín (2012, p. 103). It 
emphasizes, however, on the duality of gender 
relations and distances itself from the dichoto-
nomous logic that places men in one side and 
women on the other. 
10 Formal equality refers to the recognition 
of being equal under the law. Material equality 
transcends the concept of formal equality and 
defends that the mere recognition of equality 
under the law does not automatically generate 
an actual equality within society. 
11 A series of authors have analyzed the 
dilemmas of formal equality. See Rodríguez-
Ruiz, & Rubio-Marín, (2009); Young, (1990); 
Goodin, (1966); Parijs, (1996); Warren, (1996).
12 Iris Young also analyses how substan-
tive inequalities threaten the proper functioning 
of democracy. She states, “[w]here there are 
structural inequalities of wealth and power, for-
mally democratic procedures are likely to rein-
force them, because privileged people are able 
to marginalize the voices and issues of those 
less privileged” (Young, 2000, p. 34).
13 Charles Beitz (1990) elaborates a com-
prehensive theory of political equality. See also 
Nussbaum, (1997); Adkins, (2008); Young, 
(2000)
14 See Young (2000); Beer (2009); 
Prokhovinik (1998); Beitz, (1990).
15 Pateman viewed the social contract 
that founded the modern sovereign state as an 
enactment of a sexual contract, through which 
women were ostracized from the public realm 
and confined to the private sphere. This act of 
segregation permitted the construction of a con-
ception of independence that, in theory, was 
required to engage in politics. See Pateman 
(1988). 
16 See also Boucher (2003); Jónasdóttir 
(1988); Walby (1994); Prokhovnik (1998).
17 Other writers have also distanced them-
selves from an approximation to gender rela-
tions that focuses primarily on domination. See 
Jónasdóttir (1988).
18 For example, Jónasdóttir defends that 
relations of power should not be reduced to acts 
of violence. The author holds that one should 
unveil the acts of power that go beyond physi-
cal violence. She writes, “it may seem strange, 
but I think that it is the ‘freely given’ – and tak-
en – love that should be centered” (Jónasdóttir, 
1988, p. 312).
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19 See Taylor, (1994); Honneth (1995).
20 Gender parity is not the only mechanism 
to transform the gender relations. Education 
plays a key role in changing practices of 
domination. As claimed by Osler and Starkey, 
“The struggle for the right to education can 
be seen as part of the struggle for citizenship. 
Full citizenship depends on accessing not 
only the right of education but a number of 
rights in education and through it. Thus the 
right to education is critical in the struggle 
for citizenship. It is only when schooling is 
made accessible, acceptable, and adaptable to 
learners’ needs that the right can be realized” 
(Osler, & Starkey, 2005, p. 77). Furthermore, 
according to Fuchs and Hoecker (2004, p. 4), 
“European surveys have shown that with an 
increasing level of education, the ‘gen’.
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